Barriers to US' Development and Maintenance of Human Intelligence

Human intelligence is the intelligence collection by interpersonal contacts as opposed to the technical intelligence disciplines like the MASINT, IMINT and SIGNT. NATO refers to human intelligence as to a division of intelligence that emerges from the collection of information and provision by the human sources. HUMINT consists of conversations and interrogations with the individuals having vital information.

The information must undergo thorough evaluation and ultimately transformation into a usable form this is because a wide variety of sources’ reliability is doubtful.

The HUMINT manner of operation is under the control of nature of the information and the official protocol. HUMINT activity is not inclusive of clandestine activities but they include clandestine techniques. The intelligence sources of information can be hostile, witting or friendly.

It is pertinent to understand the individual with the sources of information and afterwards to obtain it. This can provide a lot of information in which the subject has knowledge, for example about the network of interest and interpersonal relationships.

Communication is a vital tool to HUMINT development.  It is a necessity to recruit HUMINT controlling officers who are proficient in native language of the country under scrutiny so as to develop HUMINT agents. However, the clearance process regarding security discriminates the first generation immigrants who had active relationships with their country of origin.

It has a bias for the non-heterosexuals and this is evident in dismissal of hundreds of gay solders who had vital communication skills. ²The clearance process takes too long than any immigrant is willing to put his career on hold for the sake of clearance. The government should shorten the clearance process and subject the officers’ constant surveillance.

Intelligence departments are technophobic and intertwining because of security concerns, hence it is difficult to establish control that is technical will enable the section to effectively breakdown the information officers so that even the people that the institution do not have trust to serve.  In the past spies and moles have had access to vital and large volumes of secret data. Its avoidance is through the adequate technological advancement that compartmentalize the information access. ²It can also adopt the information filtering to a specific subject and the need to establish motives and characterization of the individual requesting the information.

The information sharing technophobia of operations is among the main contributors of failure. The lack of information shared can be improved through the addition of the latest information sharing tools. Examples of these tools include the Intellipedia, A-space and the library of National Intelligence. Intellipedia uses the Mediawiki software with additional security features regarding safety issues. The analysts post any current activity in the social networks like the Facebook and MySpace. However, these creative initiatives are yet to reach the agents and analysts in the field.

³America’s persuit of freedom and human rights is responsible for the weakening of the HUMINT assets especially prior to the event of 9/11. The US government has always had the ambivalence regarding spies’ employment. In the 1990, the policy makers brought to operation SIGNT capabilities which made the HUMANT obsolete and led to lessening the emphasis on the human intelligence collection. The spies’ recruitment set in standards to avoid the   scandals and this made them oversee employment of the foreign agents, therefore resulted in the weakening the HUMINT.

Before the 9/11 event, the CIA officers in the diaspora countries managing spy networks were comprised of the foreign countries nationals. They were supposed condition to ensure that employees were not suspects or guilty of human rights violations and posed positive characteristics. Becker demonstrates that the requirements and specifications were meant to favor the individuals who were human rights crusaders. This was done in order to prevent the CIA from recurrent scandals. Such requirements discriminated the officers who had the history of human right violations despite the fact they proved to be extremely useful. Eventually it incapacitates the US from developing and maintaining HUMINT

⁷The robust covert actions capability might be the causal of the inability for attaining action oriented HUMINT through provision of alternative cruise missiles that require more targeting date details. Appropriate budget should be channeled to the HUMINT to support their activities.  

American democratic political culture has a major role in the development of HUMINT and keeping the CIA covert action abilities weak. ⁵In the late 80’s there was severe criticism of IC for various cases of abuse and e employment of various covert actions methods violating human rights hence not appropriate in a democratic state.

Failure to information sharing by different agencies resulting to turf battles is a contributing barrier to success. Intelligence community’s protocol and excessive regulation regarding compartmentalization and classification of information make sharing impossible. This goes together with the failure of the White House to prioritize the goals of intelligence and inability of the director of intelligence to prioritize the intelligence community. 

The congressional committees do not have political influence, budgetary allocations and sustainable capability that an institution requires of its head to carry out an extensive and effective oversight. ⁶The intelligence officials and policy makers do not recognize to how incomplete the intelligence remains instead they continue to create intellectually satisfying accounts.

The US military experiences in-coordination and confliction between the HUMINT operation cell and counter-intelligence coordinating authority. ³The divisional intelligence officers require a common co ordination authority and HUMINT operation cell. Currently, the divisional intelligence cannot fully de-conflict with the counter intelligence collectors and the HUMINT collectors as it does not have a centralized hold over its collection assets from which it can execute de-confliction. The new US army intelligence manual FM 2.0 and the intelligence community established 57 the counter intelligence coordinating authority to de-conflict counterintelligence sources, but doctrine does not allow de-confliction between the HUMINT operation cell and the counter intelligence coordinating authority. ⁹The coordination authority should de-conflict sources from both the counterintelligence collectors and the HUMINT operation cell.

The counter intelligence coordinating authority should work with the divisional intelligence officers that have visibility on all the sources within the unit’s area of responsibility. The new structure should give the divisional intelligence officers supervision of all HUMINT activity with the counter intelligence coordinating authority renamed the HUMINT  coordinating authority, directly subordinate to the divisional intelligence officers and coordinating both the Counterintelligence collectors and the HUMINT operation cell collectors. If non-army collectors, such as the defense HUMINT service, give the divisional intelligence or HUMINT coordinating agency visibility of their sources, then the agency should fill the HUMINT coordinating authority position. ¹⁰With a HUMINT coordinating authority, the primary collectors will be synchronized and all their sources de-conflicted, giving priority of anew source to the organization that can best utilize them.

The US intelligence lacks clear delineation between collectors which leads to wastage of resources and redundant use of sources. The US Army requires delineating sources for secondary and primary HUMINT collectors. This recommendation follows the lead of the

British in Northern Irelands’ surface contacts such as individual or political figures who do not require primary HUMINT collectors’ trainings and go to the secondary collectors. This enables the primary collectors to concentrate their efforts on sources of extreme value and that need the security protection to resources that primary collectors offer. This enables the unit’s source base expansion while maintaining the original sources.

The US military lack of the brigade intelligence officers is a great impediment to successful human intelligence. There is a need to focus on the creation of the brigade intelligence officers in the US army and this is likely to impact on the organization of the information collectors according to Holland, Jack and Susan. The US Army recognizes the demand for a brigade intelligence officer in the latest Striker Brigade Combat 58 Team. There should be a transfer of this idea over to the HUMINT intensive environment of US Army peace operation. The creation of an intelligence officer at Battalion and Brigade level is the initial step in de-conflicting sources at every level. ⁸The intelligence officer has thew same responsibilities as their divisional intelligence offices counterpart. Additionally, they act as the source de-confliction coordinates and authority. With the HUMIT coordinating authority at the division level they would assists in the committee concept through sources management of committee members.

To synchronize, coordinate and de- conflict the majority of the units, the US military should assume the Committee system at every level. ⁴The US Army tries to de-conflict and coordinate Division, Battalion and Brigade levels. However, issues arise with organizations, like Civil Affairs, Joint Commission Observers, and PSYOPS, that typically have a second chain of command or a different chain of command operating in a Line Unit’s area of responsibility. The British system of the committee would influence that conflict. At the brigade level the Operations officer would chair the committee with representation from respective staff members.

            The committee will discuss future schedules and operations of the teams. All teams will give the source information to the intelligence officer prior to the meeting. The intelligence officer‘s database of sources will include sources originating from primary and secondary collectors. Then he will address any conflicting sources, and the committee will come with a decision of which team will meet with the source.

This de-confliction prevents circular reporting and a line without a source’s office of primary and secondary collectors. ⁵The team that comes into contact with the source has the duty of collecting information that other committee members need. In the instance where combined missions are probable, their identification will be in the meeting for later organization. This aids the primary collectors to have visual contacts on sources that the secondary collectors are in contact take advantage of a previous relationship.

Majority of the second collectors lack HUMINT augmentation. Line Units have an attached operation management teams. Some secondary collectors are not trained to collect Intelligence.

To assist them in their collection, the division should assign a HUMINT team or operation management teams to the unit. The Military Intelligence battalion should provide the team or built one from the deployment augmenters. Having a resident HUMINT team the secondary collector’s unit has many benefits. ⁶The HUMINT team can: conduct debriefings of teams after a meeting, train the teams on report formats and questioning by techniques, ensure their report is entered into the HUMINT database via the HUMINT team’s automation systems they provide source biographies to the secondary collection teams, accompany teams occasionally to evaluate sources, aid in handing off a source, from or to, a primary collector and assist the unit brigade intelligence officers in the analysis of the HUMINT collected or passed from the division. Having an operation management teams or HUMINT team attached to a secondary collection unit not only assists the HUMINT community by providing intelligence that does not make it into the HUMINT system, but also the secondary unit by providing intelligence from the HUMINT database to the unit.

There is the lack of augmentation of the organic intelligence sections by the secondary collectors.

Majority of the AARs of the US military has found the intelligence sections having few employees. The US Army should try the British Army system in NI, and augment its intelligence departments with line soldiers. In addition, attaching a HUMINT should increase the intelligence analysis capability by augmenting the intelligence officers sections at all level, in addition to increasing, the secondary collection unit.

⁷Each company should have not less than two soldiers to aid in information recording, debriefing and database maintenance. They should have the expertise on activity at the company level. Similarly, extra army should augment the Brigade and Battalion intelligence officers sections. Augmentation must not come in the form of an intelligence soldier, but as in the British system, a smart rifleman who is able to do the intelligence job. A Mobile Training Team from the Army Military Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca can provide training to the riflemen in their new intelligence jobs. The division can as well conduct this training internally. During the predeployment training, the units presently conducting the peace operation can offer- on-the-job training if riflemen deploy a week before their units. This augmentation is required to handle the rising flow of intelligence and information, the delineation of committees and sources whose creation is by a committee through synchronization, de-conflict and coordination of primary.

The US Army can save resources and time by trying to adopt some of the lessons the British learned during 30 years in Northern Ireland. If the divisional intelligence office is able to create a common coordination authority over its counterintelligence collectors and HUMINT operation coordinators, it will be able to de- conflict its sources internally. If the US Army determines a clear delineation of sources for its primary and secondary collectors, it will significantly aid de-confliction of their activities. Additionally if the US Army adopts the British Committee system, it will be able to gain visibility, and coordinate or de-conflict the activities of the multitude of HUMINT elements operating in a Line Units area of responsibility. Creation of an intelligence office at the battalion and brigade levels will assist the units in de-conflicting their sources with each other and the division intelligence office. Additionally, collectors will dramatically increase their collection if augmented by a primary HUMINT team. ⁷This augmentation will also increase the flow of intelligence both to and from secondary collection units. Neither the argument nor the solution presented here are new. But if these changes are made, the HUMINT efforts in peace operations will dramatically improve.